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Picture a pasture open to all (…) As a rational being, each herdsman 
seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less 
consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding one more 
animal to the herd?” This utility has one negative and one positive 
component. 1) The positive component is a function of the increment of 
one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale 
of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. 2) The negative 
component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one 
more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by 
all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making 
herdsman is only a fraction of −1. Adding together the component partial 
utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course 
for him to pursue is to add another animal to the herd. And another; and 
another …
Digital cows grazing on digital groundsWith this picture of herdsmen 
sharing a pasture, Garrett Hardin 
illustrates in his influential paper 
The Tragedy of the Commons 
[1] the vulnerability of common 
goods towards overexploitation. 
Whenever users have free and 
uncontrolled access to exploit 
a common resource, their 
individual interests may lead to 
its overexploitation, although 
this is of disadvantage for the 
entire community of resource 
users. In other words, the selfish 
interests of the individuals prevent 
a more productive resource 
use that would be beneficial 
for everyone. A similar situation 
arises for resources that require 
maintenance. Free-riders who 
exploit a resource without 
contributing to its maintenance 
are better off than individuals who 
carry the maintenance costs, even 
if the resource eventually decays. 
 Hardin [1] points to privatization 
and governmental control as 
potential ways of avoiding the 
tragedy of the commons, mainly 
focusing on those tragedies that 
emerge because of the growth 
of the human population and its 
impact on the environment. Some 
more recent developments on 
these issues have been captured in 
previous essays in Current Biology 
[2,3]. But within the 40 years that 
passed after Hardin published his 
paper, the internet emerged — and 
with it an entire world of novel 
common goods, novel tragedies and novel, unexpected ways to 
avoid them.
Common goods in the internet
Modern communication networks 
such as the internet allow a large 
number of often anonymous 
individuals to store and exchange 
large amounts of information. 
Thereby they generate a potential 
for novel common goods consisting 
of publicly accessible information 
and/or infrastructure to process 
it. Excellent examples for such 
common goods are peer-to- peer 
networks such as Gnutella, Napster 
or Freenet [4]. Peer-to-peer 
networks allow a large number 
of anonymous users to share 
files, bandwidth and computing 
power. Users can contribute to the 
common good, for example by 
sharing their files, and can exploit 
the common good, for example by 
downloading files. Both processes 
are usually uncoupled, giving 
free-riders the chance to exploit 
the network without contributing. 
As a consequence, peer-to-peer 
networks face a similar problem  
to Hardin’s pasture: studies 
indicate that there is a high 
degree of free-riding on Gnutella, 
leading to a decline of network 
performance [5,6]. 
 Besides peer-to-peer networks, 
there are numerous other common 
goods on the internet. Software 
projects such as GNU (www.gnu.
org) provide valuable open- source 
software; companies like Craigslist (www.craigslist.org) and Amazon 
(www.amazon.com) provide public 
space for adverts and product 
reviews; and eBay (www.ebay.com) 
provides a public platform for online 
auctions and trading. Sometimes 
these public goods serve a purpose 
for the institutions that host them. 
For example, book reviews from 
Amazon’s clients may increase 
the sales and may make Amazon 
more attractive; and eBay directly 
benefits from trading activities on 
its platform. But whether hosted by 
a profit or non-profit organization, 
digital common goods are often 
generated and exploited by a large 
number of typically anonymous 
users, and even if hosts can exclude 
users, it is often not in their interest. 
 The digital common goods 
therefore face potential problems 
with cheating and free-riding. 
Trading platforms, for example, 
cannot take off if they are prone 
to cheating. Providing space 
for adverts or product reviews 
invites inadequate, illegal or 
irrelevant contributions, and 
creating free software seems 
like a hopeless act of altruism, 
considering the presence of 
commercial companies that can 
pay high salaries to their software 
writers. In order to protect these 
digital common goods, a number 
of mechanisms have been 
established. These mechanisms go 
often far beyond those suggested 
by Hardin (privatization or access 
control by the host); rather than 
relying on centralized control, 
they are based on self-organized 
interactions between users. 
GNU and GPL
One of the most astonishing 
solutions to the problem of 
protecting digital common goods 
emerged with free software projects 
such as GNU (www.gnu.org). Free 
software projects allow the users 
to copy, modify and redistribute 
their software. The success of 
Linux/GNU operating systems 
shows that free software projects 
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tremendous value. Free software 
differs in an important aspect from 
Hardin’s pasture. Because making 
an additional copy of the existing 
software comes at almost no cost, 
digital pastures do not suffer from 
digital cows grazing on it. But free 
software projects are still vulnerable 
to exploitation: competitors, such 
as commercial software producers, 
may in principle gain a competitive 
advantage over free software 
projects by using and modifying 
free software and commercializing 
the resulting products. 
 In order to prevent this, GNU 
distributes its software under the 
terms of the GNU General Public 
License (GPL) [7,8]. Compared 
with licenses associated with 
proprietary software, this license 
grants excessive rights: the 
user can run the software, study 
and modify it, and redistribute 
the original as well as modified 
versions. But in addition, GPL 
requires that derived software has 
to be distributed under GPL, too. 
This condition not only limits the 
degree to which derived software 
can be exploited commercially: 
by enforcing that work based on 
free software is distributed as free 
software, it promotes the growth of 
free software. In other words, GPL 
ensures that digital cows grazing on 
digital grounds fertilize the growth 
of digital grass.
Craigslist and Amazon
Craigslist (www.craigslist.org) is a 
small company with only a handful 
of employees and a distinctive 
non-commercial profile, which 
hosts one of the most popular web 
pages on the Internet. Essentially, 
it provides users space to publish 
advertisements in different 
categories ranging from job adverts 
to personal postings. With very 
few exceptions this is done free 
of charge, and reading the advert 
is free of charge, too. With over 
10 million adverts published per 
month, the public space offered 
by Craigslist is another excellent 
example of a flowering digital 
pasture. 
 But by providing public space 
free of charge, Craigslist is 
vulnerable to posting offending, 
illegal or irrelevant contents. By 
posting commercial spam, free- riders may even gain direct 
financial benefits. What is 
Craigslist doing to avoid this? 
Almost nothing — it allows its 
users to take care of that issue. 
At Craigslist, all users can flag 
adverts that they consider to be 
offending, illegal or just irrelevant. 
If a couple of users flag the 
same advert, it will be removed. 
In order to avoid excessive 
flagging, Craigslist makes flagging 
time- consuming; and having an 
interest to keep their favorite 
categories clean, users invest a 
little time in ‘policing’ the site. 
 The internet bookseller Amazon 
(www.amazon.com) offers a 
common good quite similar to the 
one offered by Craigslist. It allows 
clients to publish product reviews. 
Although these reviews are not 
necessarily positive, and thereby do 
not necessarily facilitate the sale of 
a particular product, they certainly 
make Amazon more attractive. But 
by offering public space, Amazon 
runs into the same problems as 
Craigslist. Some reviews can just be 
inappropriate. In order to avoid this, 
Amazon not only allow its clients to 
write reviews — it also allows them 
to review reviews, which in turn 
allows users to identify the most 
relevant ones.
eBay and its reputation system
eBay (www.ebay.com), with an 
annual revenue of 4.5 billion US 
dollars in 2005 making it one 
of the most successful internet 
companies, provides a platform 
for online auctions and trading. 
Because the presence of a large 
number of users is of advantage for 
the functioning of auctions, eBay 
has an interest not to exclude any 
users. On the other hand, trading 
between anonymous users is prone 
to cheating. Sellers may cheat by 
not shipping their merchandise after 
receiving the payment, while buyers 
may try to keep their items while 
canceling their payment, using, for 
example, a credit card chargeback. 
Legal actions against such cheating 
are possible but often associated 
with substantial costs — increasing 
the cheater’s chances to go 
unpunished. 
 In order to reduce fraudulent 
transactions on its platform, 
eBay uses a reputation system 
that allows buyers and sellers to evaluate their transactions [9]. 
The evaluations are published 
and therefore allow users to 
avoid transactions with parties 
of questionable reputation. 
Experiments on eBay show that 
a good reputation can translate 
into monetary value. Sellers with a 
good and long-lasting reputation 
can make better deals than their 
competitors with bad or without 
any reputation [10]. Although 
eBay’s reputation system is far from 
perfect — for example, cheaters 
can change their identity, and 
the reputation system is prone to 
retaliation of bad ratings — it is a 
good example of how reputation 
can help establish a large degree of 
cooperation within a community. 
Reputation and evolutionary  
game theory
The success of self-organized 
mechanisms, such as eBay’s 
reputation system, for the 
protection of common goods 
in the internet is paralleled by 
research on reciprocal altruism 
in evolutionary game theory. In 
evolutionary biology, self-organized 
mechanisms for the evolution and 
maintenance of cooperation are of 
specific importance, because for 
most organisms, the ability to file a 
complaint against a cheater simply 
does not exist. eBay’s reputation 
system, for example, resembles 
mechanisms of ‘indirect reciprocity’ 
[11–16], while Craigslist’s flagging 
system resembles ‘policing’ [17–19] 
and ‘altruistic punishment’ [20–22].
 Within the framework of 
reciprocal altruism, cooperative, 
altruistic actions can be 
advantageous, despite their costs, 
if they increase the future prospects 
of benefiting from altruistic 
actions of other individuals [23]. 
In direct reciprocity, individuals 
reciprocate previous cooperative 
interactions with their present 
interaction partner. In Axelrod’s 
famous computer tournaments 
between various strategies in 
a direct reciprocity setting, a 
surprisingly simple strategy 
called Tit-For-Tat emerged as the 
champion [24]. Tit-For-Tat starts 
with cooperation, and then just 
repeats its opponent’s last move. 
The success of Tit-For-Tat relies on 
its ability to establish cooperation 
without being exploited too much 
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identified strategies such as 
Generous Tit-For-Tat and Win-Stay 
Lose-Shift as being even more 
successful under a wide range of 
conditions [25,26]. But irrespective 
of what strategy is being played, 
direct reciprocity depends on the 
crucial condition that there are 
repeated interactions between the 
same two individuals — a condition 
that does not necessarily hold in 
biological populations, and 
in particular not for interactions 
between anonymous users in 
the internet.
 But besides the rules of direct 
reciprocity such as ‘be nice to those 
that are nice to you’, mechanisms 
of indirect reciprocity have been 
proposed, following the directive to ‘be nice to those that are nice 
to others’. In indirect reciprocity, 
individuals use information of 
previous encounters of their present 
partners with different individuals. 
One of the first, and again one of 
the simplest, strategies within this 
framework is image scoring, a 
strategy that follows the above 
directive almost literally [27]. 
More elaborate strategies such 
as standing can cope with the 
problem of distinguishing between 
unjustified and justified defection, 
the latter being defection towards 
an individual with a ‘bad’ history 
[11–14]. In an amazing study that 
appeared recently, Ohtsuki and 
Iwasa [16] analyzed 4096 strategies 
within the framework of indirect 
reciprocity and identified eight that perform best under a wide 
range of conditions. These ‘leading 
eight’ strategies illustrate that 
indirect reciprocity can be 
achieved with several similarly 
good reputation systems that 
follow different rules. 
 A mechanism similar to indirect 
reciprocity is altruistic punishment 
[21,22]. Here, the rule is ‘to punish 
those who are not nice to others’, 
even if it comes at costs, not only 
for the punished, but also for the 
punishing individual. Experiments 
have shown that altruistic 
punishment may be of high 
importance for the maintenance 
of common goods in human 
societies [20,28,29].
 An important property of 
interactions on digital grounds is Box 1
From reputation to climate protection — experiments on human behavior in public goods games.
In experimental settings of public goods games [20,36], players typically interact within small groups, say, with four members. They 
receive an amount of money and simultaneously decide whether to keep it or invest it into a group project. The experimenter then 
increases (say, doubles) the money invested into the group project. The return is shared equally between all players of the group. 
For a player who tries to maximize his individual payoff, it is the best choice in this game to keep the money and not to 
in vest (see Table 1). This is because each dollar a player invests is first doubled, but then shared among all four players, 
 resulting in a direct return of only 50% of the investment. Making an investment is beneficial for the group but does not 
 maximize the individual payoff, as is typical for a tragedy of the commons. Thus, if played repeatedly between anonymous 
players, the investments decline rapidly. Initially, most players start somewhat irrationally with a high investment. But soon they 
experience that they are exploited by free-riders, and thus stop investing [20,36]. 
This behavior changes if rounds of the public goods game are alternated with rounds of an indirect reciprocity game. In 
this game, individuals can reward other individuals by, for example, spending a dollar that is transformed into a reward of three 
dollars for the receiver. Because players only reward individuals with a good reputation it pays to invest in the public goods 
game. Making investments into the public good translates into a good reputation, which in turn translates into a higher chance 
of being rewarded in the indirect reciprocity game [36].
A recent study [34] on reputation and climate protection goes even a step further: again, rounds of a public goods game 
were alternated with an indirect reciprocity game. But the return from the public goods game was not given back to the group. 
Rather, it was invested into a climate fund, which was used to pay for an advert about the impact of human-induced CO2 
 emissions on the Earth’s climate. Although the players did not directly benefit from the climate fund, they maintained a high 
level of investment. By investing into the climate game, players could build up a good reputation, which in turn increased the 
chances of being rewarded [34,35].














Yield from the  




A 1 0 2 2 A 0 1 1.5 2.5
B 1 0 2 2 B 1 0 1.5 1.5
C 1 0 2 2 C 1 0 1.5 1.5
D 1 0 2 2 D 1 0 1.5 1.5
Total 4 8 8 Total 3 6 7
The group consists of four players. Each player has one dollar, which can be kept or invested. The total investment of the group 
is doubled, and then shared equally among all group members. If all players invest (left part of the table), the total investment is 
$4. The yield from the investment is $8, resulting in a payoff of $2 per player. By keeping rather than investing the money, a player 
can increase its own payoff at the cost of the others (right part of the table): If only three players invest, the return from the group 
investment is only $6, or $1.5 per group member. But player A, who kept his dollar now has a total payoff of $2.5.
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we do not rely on the digital 
common goods described above. 
We can choose to use them, but if 
the risk of being cheated becomes 
too high, we can choose to not 
participate at all. Such volunteering 
has been shown to stabilize 
cooperation in public goods 
games [30]. Loners that choose 
not to participate turn a game 
where cooperative behavior is 
always out-competed by cheaters 
into a rock–scissors–paper game. 
Cooperative behavior is still 
out-competed by cheating. Once 
cheating is the prevailing strategy, 
however, it is more advantageous 
not to participate in the game. 
In a population of loners, in turn, 
cooperative behavior may spread. 
These cycles of rise, fall and 
re-establishment of cooperation 
resemble the dynamics of 
peer-to-peer networks that first 
become popular, then suffer from 
overexploitation, and finally lose 
their users to other peer-to-peer 
networks.
 It remains to be seen how much 
of the findings from evolutionary 
game theory can be incorporated 
into the protection of common 
goods in the internet. But the 
success of reputation systems 
even less sophisticated than the 
‘leading eight’ is a promising 
beginning. A common criticism 
on the more complex strategies 
of indirect reciprocity is that they 
depend on reliable information 
on the behavior of others and 
require substantial cognitive 
capabilities in order to evaluate 
what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. 
Experiments suggest that even 
humans tend to use cheaper but 
less sophisticated strategies such 
as ‘image scoring’ [31,32]. 
 Presumably even users of 
eBay’s reputation system tend to 
use only the rating, but not the 
stories behind it, although they 
are available. But in principle it is 
easily possible to keep track of 
interactions on common goods in 
the internet and to handle more 
complex evaluation schemes. This 
strength can be expected to favor 
the development of more powerful 
mechanisms for the protection of 
digital common goods. Currently, 
complex reputation systems are 
established, for example, for peer-to-peer networks [33]. And 
maybe the novel mechanisms that 
help to maintain common goods 
in the internet may turn out to be 
suitable to solve the old tragedies 
addressed by Hardin [1]. Recent 
experiments on indirect reciprocity 
(Box 1) between humans in the 
context of climate control point in 
that direction [34,35].
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